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Abstract 
The Eurozone crisis challenges the scrutiny systems of national parliaments: many 
instruments tackling the crisis were established outside the EU legal framework; the crisis 
management has generally been dominated by European and national executives and 
decisions were taken under enormous time pressure. Did national parliaments become 
nonetheless involved in the scrutiny of the crisis management, and if yes how? And to what 
extent are their crisis-related scrutiny activities different from that in other EU affairs? Based 
on a quantitative data set on formal parliamentary activities in the 2010-12 period, this paper 
shows that the crisis did play an important role with regard to plenary EU debates in many 
national parliaments. Beyond debates, however, the scrutiny of the crisis management has 
surprisingly been ‘business as usual’ for most parliamentary chambers. This further cements 
the gap between formally strong and active and formally weak and inactive parliaments. 
 
Introduction 
Since the beginning of the European integration process, national parliaments have had a 
bumpy ride. For many years, European integration appeared mainly as a threat to national 
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parliaments, given that they were seen to be losing legislative authority to the European level. 
However, over time many of the ‘poor losers’ of integration have learned ‘to fight back’ and 
obtained stronger participation rights in the domestic handling of European policy (Winzen 
2012).1 Since the coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty national parliaments even have an 
explicit role within the EU’s legislative process, in particular as the new guardians of the 
subsidiarity principle.  
However, it seems that the challenges national parliaments face have reached a new level 
within the context of the eurozone crisis and the resulting changes in the economic 
governance of the EU: Crisis management ‘by summit’ (Schulz, 2012) has become the norm; 
intergovernmental treaties outside the EU legal framework weaken parliamentary 
participation rights; strict austerity measures, financial guarantees, closer economic policy 
coordination and enforced budgetary discipline all impact core areas of parliamentary 
authority. What we know far less about is how parliaments have accompanied the 
management of the crisis. Are backbenchers still ‘fighting back’ or were they marginalized by 
a highly technocratic, executive-dominated crisis management? Much of the literature and 
political commentaries seem to suggest the latter (e.g. Fox, 2012, Landfried, 2012, Münkler, 
2012). A severe lack of basic parliamentary involvement would, however, not only make it 
more difficult for member states to take national ‘ownership’ of the crisis management, but 
also challenge the advances made in terms of the democratic legitimacy of the EU. 
Against this background, the paper addresses two questions: Did national parliaments become 
involved in the scrutiny of the current crisis management, and if yes how? And to what extent 
are their scrutiny activities in crisis-related matters actually different from that in other EU 
                                                
1  Due to reasons of space, we are not able to discuss the broad literature on national parliaments in the EU, 
but Goetz/Meyer-Sahling 2008, Raunio 2009 and Winzen 2010 provide excellent reviews.  
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affairs? For the analysis, we draw on a quantitative data set of parliamentary activities in EU 
affairs between 2010 and 2012 established within the OPAL2 project (see Auel, 2014).  
The aim of this short contribution is thus a humble one: to investigate how national 
parliaments have accompanied the crisis management by providing a comparative overview 
over their crisis-related scrutiny activities. As the data does not allow us to compare the 
activities of national parliaments to the period before 2010, we are unable to analyze whether 
the crisis has had a more general impact on parliamentary scrutiny. Given the constraints in 
terms of space, we also have to leave more systematic explanations for the variation in the 
level of activities to future publications.  
 
Economic Governance Reform and its Impact on National Parliaments 
In early 2010, the sovereign debt crisis hit the EU. Starting with Greece, it has spread to other 
member states since then, most notably Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Cyprus. To tackle the 
crisis, EU member states have agreed economic governance reforms to manage and overcome 
what is now often labelled the ‘eurozone crisis’. The reforms are too numerous to be 
discussed in detail here (for an overview see Kunstein and Wessels, 2012), but among the 
most important are the initial European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and the permanent 
European Stability Mechanism (ESM), the so-called ‘six pack’ and ‘two pack’ (including the 
‘European Semester’ and a reform of the Stability and Growth Pact) and the Treaty on 
Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union (TSCG, 
commonly known as the ‘Fiscal Compact’ which requires member states to achieve a surplus 
or at least a balanced budget as well as the incorporation of constitutional or statutory 
mechanisms to limit public borrowing). 
                                                
2  The Observatory of National Parliaments after Lisbon, OPAL, http://www.opal-europe.org.  
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Both the content and the implementation of these reforms have impacted national parliaments 
in a number of ways. All parliaments – although to different degrees – obliged themselves to 
consolidate their budgets. Instruments such as the European Semester or the Fiscal Compact 
impact future fiscal and economic policy decisions of all (participating) member states and 
thus one of the most hallowed parliamentary prerogatives – budgetary sovereignty. The 
programme countries, already limited in their freedom of action due to their dire financial 
situation, had to sign and implement so-called Memoranda of Understanding obliging them to 
implement far reaching austerity reforms as a precondition for financial assistance from the 
EFSF or ESM. The donor countries, in contrast, have to shoulder large financial guarantees 
which may severely limit their future political room for manoeuvre if they ever become due. 
With the EU in full crisis mode, the European Council and the Euro Area Summit have 
become the most important forums for decision-making in EMU affairs further strengthening 
the role of executives in EU affairs. Together with the Eurogroup, the two bodies have turned 
into a kind of European economic government (Wessels and Rozenberg, 2013). Some of the 
most far reaching instruments that they initiated - such as the EFSF, the ESM or the Fiscal 
Compact - are also based on intergovernmental agreements or treaties outside the EU legal 
framework. As a result, national governments treated (or tried to treat) the latter as foreign 
rather than EU policy, which generally limits parliaments’ involvement.  
So far we know little about how national parliaments reacted to the challenges described 
above. Studies indicate that parliamentary participation rights, for example regarding ex ante 
and ex post scrutiny of European Councils or Euro Area Summits vary considerably (Wessels 
and Rozenberg, 2013). The same is true for new instruments, such as the EFSF, where some 
parliaments have extensive oversight and veto rights concerning decisions at the European 
level (for the German Bundestag see Höing, 2013), while others have mere information rights 
or are hardly involved in the process at all (Deutsche Bank, 2011). Thus, there are clear 
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indications that the crisis has not simply weakened all parliaments in the same way. To test 
this claim, we present the data on crisis-related parliamentary activities in the following.  
 
Dealing With the Crisis: Business as usual?  
For the purpose of this paper, we draw on comparative empirical data on parliamentary 
activities in EU affairs between 2010 and 2012 across all 27 national parliaments (Auel et al., 
2014). From the larger data set, we selected all crisis-related resolutions or mandates, plenary 
debates and opinions submitted within the Early Warning System (EWS) or the Political 
Dialogue.3 Our final data set consists of 993 crisis-related parliamentary activities and thus of 
roughly 19 per cent of the overall EU activities of the Lower Chambers (5142 activities). 
                                                
3  This included all activities on (1) crisis-related EU legislative proposals and pre-legislative documents, 
(2) all intergovernmental measures initiated outside the legal EU framework, and (3) all activities where 
the content showed sufficient relation to the crisis. The latter is based on a qualitative assessment and 
includes, for instance, general debates on the crisis or on relevant government declarations before or after 
European Councils and Euro Area Summits, but also parliamentary resolutions dealing with the crisis 
outside of specific EU proposals. The data collection took place between May 2012 and February 2013 on 
the basis of a detailed codebook. Data was collected from parliamentary websites and the European 
Commission website for the Political Dialogue 
(http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/secretariat_general/relations/relations_other/npo/index_en.htm) and cross-
checked through the Interparliamentary EU Information Exchange (IPEX) database. In addition, the 
coders requested and confirmed data from parliamentary information offices. The 25 coders are mostly 
native speakers and received training in two workshops. Each coded activity was documented in a PDF 
file, and the data was checked both during the coding process and ex post by two supervisors individually 
to ensure accuracy. In addition, a questionnaire sent to national parliaments provided data on the average 
length of EU plenary debates and the overall time spent on all plenary. After a third reminder, the return 
rate was 100 per cent, although some specific data was missing in a few cases. Missing data was added 
through the authors’ own calculations. 
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A few shortcomings and caveats of the data collection need to be mentioned. The selected 
activities cover the most important means of national parliaments to get involved in EU 
politics: resolutions/mandates providing parliaments with the opportunity to give their opinion 
on EU documents and the government’s negotiation position (policy-influencing function), 
plenary debates serving public deliberation and control (communication function), and 
reasoned opinions within the EWS as well as opinions within the Political Dialogue (policy 
influence directly at the EU level). It does, however, omit other instruments or activities such 
as parliamentary questions or Committee meetings and, especially, informal means of 
influence and control. This omission is, unfortunately, part of the trade-off between large and 
small N studies. Given the aim of covering all national parliaments in the EU, we had to rely 
on quantitative data that is both accessible and comparable across all chambers. Investigating 
informal strategies, in contrast, not only relies on qualitative data sources, but is also 
extremely difficult to quantify. Finally, simply counting activities tells us little about the 
impact of parliamentary involvement, i.e. whether more active parliaments also succeed in 
controlling and influencing their governments effectively. The data set therefore measures 
what parliaments do, but not whether they are actually successful. 
Still, as table 1 shows, the eurozone crisis impacted significantly on parliamentary activities. 
In the period under investigation national parliaments spent almost one thousand hours 
debating crisis-related issues in over 450 plenary debates and issued nearly 440 mandates or 
resolutions on this topic. In contrast, reasoned opinions (Early Warning System) were rarely 
submitted on crisis-related legislative proposals. Despite the fact that many crisis instruments 
have a direct impact on core parliamentary competencies, national parliaments rarely 
expressed concerns about questions of subsidiarity. 
[Table 1 about here] 
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However, to assess whether the crisis was treated differently by national parliaments 
compared to other EU issues, we need to compare the parliamentary engagement in both 
areas. For the comparison, we calculated a score for the level of activity based on the three 
types of activities. The values for each activity indicator4 were first normalized on a scale 
from 0 to 15, added up to an overall score and divided by three.  
A first result is that we find a strong correlation between the level of activity related to the 
crisis and the level of activity in other EU policy areas (Figure 1).  
[Figure 1 about here] 
Overall, it seems, the crisis has neither significantly increased nor limited the use of 
parliamentary instruments in EU matters. At least when it comes to their overall level of 
engagement, the crisis is mainly ‘business as usual’ for national parliaments. Parliaments 
showing high levels of activities in EU affairs do also show high levels in the crisis 
management – independent of the fact whether they adopted the common currency or had 
been hit significantly by the crisis. 
[Table 2 about here] 
However, as table 2 shows, the crisis had a very different impact on specific parliamentary 
activities. The share of resolutions/mandates and opinions is similar - and comparatively low 
                                                
4  Mandates/resolutions: absolute number; debates: combined indicator measuring the absolute number of 
EU debates and their share out of the overall debating time spent in the plenary to account for the 
variation in general plenary activity (for further details see Auel et al, 2014). We decided against 
weighing the different types of activities since the consideration whether one type of activity is more 
important than others (and, in quantitative terms, exactly how much more important) is a normative 
question.  
5  Unity based normalisation: X i, 0 to 1 = (Xi – XMin)/(XMax – XMin), where Xi = each data point I, XMin = the 
minima among all the data points, XMax = the maxima among all the data points, Xi, 0 to 1 = the data point i 
normalised between 0 and 1.  
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– and roughly reflects the ratio of crisis related documents out of all documents published by 
the Commission in 2010 – 2012.6 In contrast, the share of the number and hours of plenary 
debates on crisis issues is fairly impressive. 
The findings are also supported when we compare the relative share of resolutions/mandates 
regarding crisis-related and other EU issues for the individual parliaments (figure 2).7 The 
percentages do have to be viewed with some care, as they are, at least in some cases, based on 
low absolute numbers. However, they indicate that - in relative terms and with few exceptions 
- the crisis played an important, but not a dominating role when it comes to issuing 
parliamentary positions. It is simply one, albeit important, area out of many areas of EU 
policy. Only in Belgium, Cyprus and Greece did parliament not issue any resolutions on crisis 
issues at all.  
[Figure 2 about here] 
When it comes to the relative share of crisis debates, the differences between the parliaments 
are much greater, ranging from less than 10 per cent to over 80 percent crisis-related debates 
out of all EU debates (figure 3). In 16 out of the 27 parliaments, more than 40 per cent of all 
                                                
6  A precise comparison between the shares of crisis-related documents of the Commission and crisis related 
activities of national parliaments is impossible, because parliamentary activities are not always a direct 
reaction to EU Commission documents. However, a search for all documents published by the European 
Commission in 2010 to 2012 on the Eur-lex website results in 11750 documents. The same search for 
documents that contain the words ‘crisis’ AND ‘financial’ returns 1369 documents, which represents 11.7 
per cent of all documents.  
7  The low number of reasoned opinions (EWS) on crisis matters does not allow drawing any substantial 
conclusions other that national parliaments were either not very concerned about subsidiarity issues or at 
least did not think it opportune to voice such concerns publicly. Similar, the number of political Dialogue 
opinions on crisis documents, of which over 40 per cent (38) were submitted by the Portuguese 
Assembleia, is too low for a meaningful comparison.  
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EU debates dealt with the eurozone crisis; in 11 parliaments, even 50 per cent and more of all 
EU debates were related to the crisis.  
[Figure 3 about here] 
Interestingly - with the exception of the Czech parliament – especially the countries that will 
adopt the common currency in the near future are those with the lowest share of crisis-related 
debates (Bulgaria, Hungary, Latvia8, Lithuania, Poland, Romania). 
The scatterplot in figure 4 further supports the findings: Eurozone membership has little 
impact on the mandating activity, but in all non-eurozone members (striped markers) - with 
the slight exception of the UK - plenary debates concerning crisis-related issues play a far 
smaller role than in parliaments of eurozone members – and this is especially the case for 
those where membership is planned.  
[Figure 4 about here] 
Also striking are the differences between debtor and donor parliaments within the eurozone. 
Neither Greece, Ireland nor Portugal (indicated by the circular striped markers) are very 
active in trying to influence their government by issuing resolutions on crisis issues. And 
while they do debate crisis issues more regularly than many of the non-eurozone parliaments, 
they remain well below average as well. Together with Cyprus and Spain (two member states 
that became debtors in late 2012 and early 2013, respectively), they are among the least active 
when it comes to the crisis. It can, of course, be argued that these parliaments have fewer 
incentives to scrutinize the EU crisis management due to both, internal pressures to deal with 
their fiscal problems as well as, especially, external pressures emanating from the EU level to 
accept conditions for financial support. The only exception is the Irish parliament. Although 
the reform of its scrutiny procedures in in June 2011 was not triggered by the crisis as such, 
the Dáil Éireann has since made regular use of its right to debate, for example, statements of 
                                                
8  Latvia adopted the common currency at the beginning of 2014. 
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the Taoiseach on formal and informal European Council meetings as well as Euro Area 
Summits (see also Wessels and Rozenberg, 2013).  
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
The aim of this paper was to provide empirical evidence on how parliaments reacted to the 
challenges of the Eurozone crisis. A first important finding is that national parliaments have 
not generally been stunned into inertia, but dealt with the crisis similarly to how they deal 
with other EU affairs. This questions, at least to some extent, the assumption that the specific 
conditions of the crisis and the crisis management (executive dominance, time pressure, 
agreements outside of the Treaties and claims of ‘no alternative’) generally marginalized 
national parliaments or made parliamentary scrutiny too difficult. One explanation is that the 
crisis measures also included a sizeable number of EU directives and regulations that national 
parliaments deal with through their usual scrutiny procedures. Many parliaments have 
developed institutional routines - for instance the involvement of the specialized standing 
committees - which facilitate the scrutiny of crisis-related issues. Yet despite a general 
increase in parliamentary scrutiny rights over the last years (Winzen, 2012), a number of 
parliaments are still generally inactive in EU matters, and this is especially the case for some 
of the programme countries. 
Second, although the overall activity level in the crisis is similar to that in other EU affairs, 
debates played a prominent role. Since the data does not allow a comparison to parliamentary 
activities before 2010, we cannot draw conclusions on whether parliaments have indeed 
become more active when it comes to debating EU issues due to the crisis, or whether the 
crisis has simply been the dominant topic among EU debates. Some studies, however, do 
indicate that the crisis has led to a greater politicization of EU issues within national 
parliaments (Puntscher Riekmann and Wydra, 2013; Wendler, 2014). Parliaments seem to 
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have become at least somewhat more willing to poke the famous ‘sleeping giant’ (Van der 
Eijk and Franklin, 2004) when it comes to crisis issues.  
Third, with regard to the crisis and to other EU affairs, we can find both, rather active 
parliaments and scrutiny laggards – and a large field in between. However, an assessment of 
parliamentary activity depends not only on the level of engagement, but also on the prior 
definition what this role ought to consist of. If the policy-influencing function is considered 
most important, the Nordic parliaments perform especially well. With regard to the 
communication function, many eurozone parliaments are among the more active debaters. 
Non-eurozone countries – and especially those preparing to enter the Eurozone – debate the 
crisis less often. Given that a majority of their citizens are rather critical of the prospect of 
adopting the euro (Eurobarometer, 2013), these parliaments seem to prefer keeping the giant 
sedated by not publicly debating potential dangers and challenges related to the adoption of 
the common currency.  
Due to space limitations, this short contribution did not attempt to explain variation in the 
level of parliamentary activity more systematically. Institutional capacities in EU affairs, 
political factors (i.e. Eurosceptical parties in parliament) but also specific macro-economic 
factors are likely to influence parliamentary activities related to the crisis. We will explore 
such explanations in a future publication. But the fact remains that there is still a large gap 
between the strongest and most active parliaments in the EU and the weakest, least active. It 
is this gap, firmly cemented by the crisis, which is the greatest challenge to parliamentary 
legitimacy in the EU. 
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Table 1 Descriptive data on crisis-related parliamentary activities 2010-2012 
 Type of activities 
 
Number of 
plenary 
debates  
Hours of 
plenary 
debates 
Mandates/ 
resolutions 
Reasoned 
opinions on 
subsidiarity 
Political 
dialogue 
opinions 
EU 27 crisis 
activities 
abs. (av.) 
454 (17) 998 (37) 438 (16) 12 (0.4) 89 (3) 
Source: Authors’ data. Note: For all activities, the table provides the absolute number of all observations for 
2010 to 2012 and the average across all 27 parliaments in brackets. 
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Figure 1: Scrutiny of the crisis management – business as usual? 
 
Source: Authors’ data. Notes: AV indicates the average for both scores, r(27) = 0.840, p < 0.001. 
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Table 2: Comparison by Type of Activity 
 Type of activities 
 
Number of 
plenary 
debates  
Hours of 
plenary 
debates 
Mandates/ 
resolutions 
Reasoned 
opinions on 
subsidiarity 
Political 
dialogue 
opinions 
crisis activities 
abs. (av.) 454 (17) 998 (37) 438 (16) 12 (0.4) 89 (3.3) 
other EU activ. 
abs. (av.) 625 (23) 1106 (41) 2697 (100) 96 (3.6) 713 (26) 
all EU activities 
abs. (av.) 1079 (40) 2104 (78) 3153 (117) 108 (4) 802 (30) 
% crisis out of 
all EU activities 42,1% 47.4% 14% 11.1% 11,1% 
Source: Authors’ data. Note: For all activities, the table provides the absolute number of all observations for 
2010 to 2012 as well as the average across all 27 parliaments in brackets. 
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Figure 2: Share of resolutions/mandates on crisis issues and other EU issues 
 
Source: Authors’ data.  
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Figure 1: Share of debates on crisis issues and other EU issues 
  
Source: Authors’ data.  
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Figure 2: Parliamentary Activities (scores) and Eurozone membership 
Source: Authors’ data. Note: Black diamond markers indicate eurozone member states, striped diamond markers 
non-eurozone member states and circular striped markers debtor countries. 
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